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RESUMO
Protocolos de Segurança estão na nossa rotina diária e exemplos disto
são compras utilizando o cartão de crédito, eleição eletrônica, redes sem
fio e etc. O primeiro objetivo deste trabalho é a verificação formal dos
aspectos de segurança de um protocolo voltado para Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN). O Trustful Space-Time Protocol (TSTP) engloba a
maioria das características necessárias para aplicações WSN como por
exemplo controle de acesso, roteamento geográfico de pacotes, estima-
tiva de localização, clock precisamente sincronizado, canais de comuni-
cação segura e um esquema de distribuição de chaves entre o gateway
e os sensores. Após a análise formal do protocolo de distribuição de
chaves do TSTP usando Proverif, nós encontramos duas falhas de se-
gurança: uma relacionada ao componente de sincronização de tempo
e outra relacionada ao método mac-then-encrypt empregado. Com as
falhas encontradas nós propómos uma versão melhorada do protocolo
de distribuição de chaves. O segundo objetivo é criar um esquema de
controle de acesso sensível ao contexto para dispositivos Internet de
Coisas(IoC) usando TSTP como canal de comunicação. O esquema da
política foi projetado para um cenário Smart Campus e seu contexto.
Aproveitamos os recursos do TSTP para adicionar dados de tempo e
espaço como contexto para o nosso modelo. Após o desenho do modelo
de política, descrevemos seu modelo simbólico e fizemos uma análise
formal para ter certeza de que os valores das propriedades de contexto
não foram adulterados.
Palavras-chave: Redes de sensores sem fio, internet das coisas, veri-
ficação formal, consciência do contexto ,controle de acesso

ABSTRACT
Security protocols are included in our every day routine. A few exam-
ples are credit card purchases, e-voting, wireless networks, etc. The
first goal of this dissertation is the formal verification of the security
aspects of a cross-layer, application-oriented communication protocol
for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). The Trustful Space-Time Proto-
col (TSTP) encompasses a majority of features recurrently needed by
WSN applications like medium access control, geographic routing, lo-
cation estimation, precise time synchronization, secure communication
channels and a key distribution scheme between sensors and the sink.
After the security protocol analysis of TSTP’s key distribution protocol
using ProVerif we were able to find two security flaws: one related to
the time synchronization component and another being a bad appro-
ach related to a mac-then-encrypt method employed. With our findings
we propose an improved version of the key distribution protocol. The
second goal is to create a context-aware access control scheme for Inter-
net of Things(IoT) devices using TSTP as a communication channel.
The policy’s scheme was designed for a Smart Campus scenario and
its context. We take advantage of TSTP’s features to add time and
space data as context for our model too. After the design of the policy
model, we described its symbolic model and we did a formal analysis
to be sure that the context properties values were not tampered.
Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks, Internet of Things, Formal Ve-
rification, Security Protocol Analysis, Context-Aware ,Access Control
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1 INTRODUCTION
According to Statista website(NEWS, 2016) in 2016 the number of
connected devices worldwide was already more than twenty two billion.
It is also expected that this number will double in the next 4 years. This
data indicates that the next big step in Internet expansion will be the
wide integration of smart objects(COUNCIL, 2008b). The infrastructure
of these smart things will comprise hardware, software, services and the
communication channel between all of these(COMMUNITIES, 2008).
The new facet of the Internet will not be the people, but our
everyday "things"(COMMUNITIES, 2008) . In this scenario the things
will be everywhere, sensing our surroundings and interacting with the
physical world to make our lives easier. These things will be com-
municating using wireless networks, making the existence of extensive
Wireless Sensors and actuator Networks (WSNs) a reality. The om-
nipresence of such WSNs is what we will call the Internet of Things
(IoT).
The IoT concept can be described as the presence of smart-
objects spread all over the place with a unique address scheme (ATZORI;
IERA; MORABITO, 2010). These things generally are able to commu-
nicate with neighboring nodes to achieve an arbitrary goal. The main
aspect of the IoT concept is the high rate of adoption by people in
their day to day routine. It is expected to be mostly noticeable in he-
alth care, assisted living, home automation, manufacturing, and many
other fields. The problem that comes with the massive adoption of such
"things"is that the number of possible threats rises proportionally to
the number of devices on the market. The security risks present on the
interactions of this everyday object could do more damage than the
Internet has done to date.
Iot infrastructure can be divided into three layers(ZHAO; GE,
2013), the first layer, which works with comprehensive perception and
is responsible for the data gathering anytime and anywhere, is called
the perception layer. The second layer works with the network and
guarantees data is updated safely and in real time or with a reliable
transmission. The third layer is related to the application involved and
works with pre-processing a data package before sending it to any other
node. The main focuses of this dissertation lay in Layers 2 and 3.
The devices we are considering in this work are low cost sen-
sors connected to a wireless sensor network spread on the environment
making part of an IoT. This type of network could use the common
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TCP/IP standard, but as pointed out by (XIAO; WANG; YANG, 2006)
the abstract characteristic of TCP/IP networks is incomplete and inef-
ficient for the security in WSNs. Another approach for constructing
WSNs is the use of more concise communication protocol design based
on a cross-layer approach.
A crosslayer-design for multi-hop wireless networks shares para-
meters in each layer preventing multi-layer attacks(KHAN; LOO; DIN,
2009). The main advantage a cross-layer approach has is that it ge-
nerates less routing overhead and less exchanges of acknowledgement
packets than the standard TCP/IP based networks. These advantages
facilitate handling the important WSN features such as high energy ef-
ficiency, connectivity and hardware limitations that make environment
sensing harder. The next step of the WSN is to integrate heterogene-
ous communication technologies in order to become more related to the
Internet of Things(IoT).
According to Kevin Ashton(ASHTON, 2009) the Internet of Things
shows potential to change the world just like the Internet did. Back
in 2009, all the Internet content, around fifty petabytes, was mainly
captured by human beings. The problem is that people are not as ac-
curate as a computer and they have limits. They can’t stay focused
on some environmental situation twenty-four hours a day, seven days
a week. Therefore, we need to push forward sensor technology so that
computers can have a better awareness of the world, and all this collec-
ted data can become strategic information. The need for IoT security
is clear.
IoT security is no longer just a future problem. It is a problem
right now according to Cisco studies(CISCO, 2015). These studies in-
dicate that between 37% and 47% of enterprises all over the world are
planning to deploy IoT infrastructures and that between 29% and 38%
of the same sample deployed IoT infrastructures over the last three ye-
ars. There are different elements required to enable IoT solutions like
Wi-Fi, real-time location tracking, GPS Tracking, security sensors, etc.
The IoT applications are susceptible to internal and external se-
curity issues like malwares, malicious software, network attacks and
external hackers. As stated by Cisco, 28% to 47% of enterprise organi-
zations have experienced security breaches in their deployed infrastruc-
tures. The numbers of IoT breaches has been increasing exponentially
over the last two years and has reached a state where security must
be a functional requirement for all applications that will run on this
technology.
The study of IoT security is paramount to the creation of a
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safer environment for us to live in. We need the creation of tailored
communication protocols that envisage, among other things, security
by design. In this sense we have seen the creation and deployment of
cross-layer communication protocols with embedded security features.
A missing part of this puzzle is the verification of the guarantees claimed
by the protocol designers and their implementations.
1.1 MOTIVATION
Our motivations lay in the fact that most of the IoT design is
being done without security in mind and that security is a feature that
ends up being built in after the “thing"is done. There is a lot of space
for things to go wrong as already discussed in the previous section.
Even if security is embedded at the time of design, it is not always
straight forward that the security will follow throughout the lifetime of
the device.
With that in mind, our motivation is to demonstrate the feasibi-
lity of formally verifying an IoT security protocol that claims a secure
design. We would like at first to use state of the art formal verification
techniques to verify the key distribution scheme for a cross-layer IoT
communication protocol. This verification can detect flaws or corrobo-
rate the key features of such protocol. Thorough study of such protocol
can further develop its goals and identify the security scenarios where
these goals can be claimed.
As a second part of our work we would like to give these things
the ability to deploy an access control scheme that is based on context.
The capability of deciding on infrastructure security based on contexts
is something we take for granted but that is not usually available for our
devices. In this sense we would like to extend the cross-layer security
protocol of choice so that it can have a security by context Access
control policy and that this policy is formally verified using state of the
art formal verification tool.
1.2 JUSTIFICATION
The TCP/IP model has a blackbox design that hides internal in-
formation about the functioning of each layer(FU et al., 2014). Applying
this model to IoT has been confirmed to be a big mistake(MIYOSHI;
SUGANO; MURATA, 2002) (BALAKRISHNAN; KATZ, 1998), because so-
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metimes it is more valuable to use the layer’s hidden data to diagnosis
network problems than to just disconnect it and try to reconnect again.
One solution is the adoption of Cross-Layer Designs, which are able to
evaluate the relationship between layers. These designs have a wide
reconfiguration capability, too.
There are a lot of works on the Cross-Layer Designs area and
some of them try to broaden IoT requirements(DUNKELS; ÖSTERLIND;
HE, 2007), but generally focus on improving packet routing, MAC and
QoS. Only a few works look to security needs. These designs usually
maintain the modularity present on the original layered TCP/IP stan-
dard. Features that most of the works do not cover are geo-location
applications and the characteristics involving this segment, such as spa-
tial localization, time synchronization, geographic routing and security.
Most of the protocols that are available for IoT today only focus
on simpler security goals and usually only achieve secrecy and authen-
tication. Due to the intrinsic physical nature of the sensors and actua-
tors that make up part of an IoT environment, it is expected that these
things are able to make decisions not only made by observations but by
context. In this sense we believe that adding context aware access con-
trol strategies to IoT security protocols can make these devices more
usable and prepared for the real necessities that surround people.
We have chosen for this work the Trustful Space-Time Protocol
(TSTP) (RESNER; FROHLICH, 2015). This protocol was readily avai-
lable as the focus of this study of a close-by group and brings all the
characteristics that we were aiming at formally verifying . The TSP
brings a coupled key exchange and authentication scheme that was ne-
ver verified. It also has a powerful implementation(RESNER; FROHLICH,
2015) and reasonable deployment in daily scenarios around the UFSC
Campus in Brazil (RESNER; FRÖHLICH, 2015). These characteristics
make the protocol an ideal candidate for us to verify and extend.
1.2.1 Objectives
Our objectives were to choose a communication protocol for IoT
environments focused on applications with security requirements. We
then formally verified the protocol to see if it could be trusted. We
then designed and formalized a context-aware access control policy to
guarantee secure operations.
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1.2.2 Specific Objectives
• Describe TSTP’s key bootstrapping protocol architecture using a
formal language;
• Describe TSTP’s time synchronization protocol architecture using
a formal language;
• Verify the protocol’s description into Proverif;
• Gather the policy requirements of UFSC’s University Restaurant;
• Represent the policy scenario with all the features needed;
• Define the Requestor and Resource Contexts, Protection and Ac-
tive Contexts for the policy based on Proteus Context Model;
• Describe the policy using a formal language;
• Verify the policy’s description into Proverif;
1.2.3 Publications
The following publications are results of our research work:
1. We published the article "Formal Verification of a Cross-Layer,
Trustful Space-Time Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks"(SILVA
et al., 2016a) at ICISS 2016;
2. We will submit the article "A Context-Aware Access Control
Scheme for the Internet of Things"for ARES 2017
This dissertation includes direct text from the two publications.
These text were re-arranged to avoid repetitions and to make sense in
this dissertation format.
1.2.4 Methodology
The methodology we used to achieve our goals was:
1. Review related work: this step aims to gather theoretical kno-
wledge about the Internet of Things and the protocols related to
this segment. A bibliography research about Protocols for Inter-
net of Things, Protocol Analysis and Context-Awareness will be
performed.
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2. Review of the state-of-art: in this step we analysed co-related
works found on the literature. For the first goal we analysed the
surveys involving the IoT, Cross-layer Protocols approach for wi-
red and wireless networks and for the second goal we analysed
chapters of a book about access control policies for IoT envi-
ronments and access control surveys. After that we were able to
understand more about our research questions and this step made
the path for achieving these goals easier.
3. Describe the TSTP using Proverif : this step was very impor-
tant for the formal analysis. In this step we did iterations of
formal description, trying to get the description as representative
of TSTP’s protocol as we can.
4. Analysis of Proverif Output : in this step we run TSTP’s formal
description on the Proverif tool. The output of the tool was very
helpful to better represent the protocol and after that we were
able to find the security breach.
5. Fix Protocol breaches: in this step we used our experience in
security to guide us to a better solution to the found breaches.
The first sub-step was to make changes to the protocol to fit our
possible solution and test it again on the tool. The second sub-
step was to change some structures within the protocol, to follow
literature advice.
6. Draw a conclusion : this step was meaningful to understand what
we could achieve after the goal achievement.
7. Representation of Access Control Policies: in this step we picked
the most representative access control policy to represent using
a formal language. After some representation on pen and paper,
we started to formally describe the policies.
8. Policy Analysis: in this step we test the formal description against
an attacker. We were able to see that it is hard to verify the po-
licy’s behavior with the known tools. The output of this analysis
was that the sensitive data used on the policy remained secret.
1.2.5 Contributions
Our first contribution is a formal verification of the security as-
pects of the Trustful Space-Time Protocol, an application-oriented,
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cross-layer WSN protocol. We specified and verified TSTP’s time
synchronization and key bootstrapping protocols(RESNER; FRÖHLICH,
2015) in the automatic cryptographic protocol verification tool ProVe-
rif.
From the automatic analysis, we were able to find a subtle attack
that would allow an attacker to effectively impersonate the gateway
to a sensor node and read all (assumed) private and authenticated
data it sends. We propose two possible punctual alterations in the
protocol to counter-measure this security flaw, preventing this attack.
Furthermore, we proposed another topical change not detected as a flaw
by ProVerif, but that would increase security: a change of a MAC-then-
Encrypt method employed to Encrypt-then-MAC.
Our second contribution so far is that we have selected our
case study scenario and modelled it using a web ontology language
to understand the necessary features. We described our access control
context models based on Proteus(BOTTAZZI; MONTANARI; TONINELLI,
2007) models that are prepared for the context-aware variability nee-
ded. These descriptions will help us to formally represent the policies
in a proper way so that we can analyse it against policy violations and
conflicts using a theorem prover.
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THIS WORK
This thesis is organized in 5 chapters. Chapter 1 presented a
contextualization of this work’s scope. We selected our research goals,
the generic and specific objectives, we showed our publications and the
methodology followed for this thesis.
Chapter 2 shows a theoretical background about IoT Protocols,
the Trustful Space-Time Protocol(TSTP), Formal Analysis and Access
Control in IoT environments.
Chapter 3 is the corrected version of our first published arti-
cle.The Chapter 4 is the corrected version of our second submitted
article. We choose to remove some parts of the articles to reduce
background content repetition, however it will have context repetition
between the article and the thesis.
In Chapter 5 we show our conclusions, and we relate our two
goals with the objectives. In this chapter we share our vision of future
work, too.
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2 CONTEXTUALIZATION AND LITERATURE
REVIEW
In this chapter we will be reviewing the background information
needed for the reader to understand our propositions, as well as to
locate our work within the current state of the art of the area.
This section is a compilation from two papers we wrote with the
results. We used this section to condense the background information
and relate the work for the two topics in this dissertation.
2.1 IOT CONTEXTUALIZATION
Internet access by devices reached more than a billion users in
2010 and it is expected that by 2020 fifty billion gadgets will be acces-
sing the Web(CERP-IOT, 2010). An incredible revolution was observed
in the way that interconnected devices generate information by sensing
environment variables(GUBBI et al., 2013). This environmental sensing
requires new approaches and new techniques to manage the myriad of
information flows generated by the Internet of Things.
In our work we will consider that the objects or things connected
are sensors or actuators. All this hardware is connected using wireless
communication technology, forming a Wireless Sensor Network(WSN).
This kind of network could use the standard TCP/IP model(FU et al.,
2014) as the standard “Internet of People” does. This would provide
standard data encapsulation, but this model does not take into ac-
count particular WSN characteristics, such as resource-constrained de-
vices, ad-hoc connectivity, the need for high energy efficiency, notions
of the environment, and mainly the security needs inherent to objects
interacting with the physical world. These open problems have been
motivating researchers to propose different protocol designs. It has
been shown that cross-layer designs are a great alternative for opti-
mizing WSN and wireless networks in general(MENDES; RODRIGUES,
2011), fulfilling the mentioned requirements. Cross-Layer designs are
built so that each layer’s parameters can be shared directly with other
layers to reach optimization goals, breaking the traditional black-box,
stacked model.
As defined by Atzori et al.(ATZORI; IERA; MORABITO, 2010),
IoT is a network of interconnected things on a world-wide scale. These
things have a unique address and communicate with each other using
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standardized WSN protocols. Aligned with the definition of this rese-
arch area, we have the challenges that come with it, like the integration
of things, computable resource restrictions, connectivity, energy effici-
ency, security and operation. Hence, there are many particularities
about the inception of this area that have not been solved yet.
The Trustful Space-time Protocol(TSTP)(RESNER; FROHLICH,
2015) we chose to analyze is an application-oriented, cross-layer pro-
tocol with synchronized time, spatial localization and distribution of
sink-node keys. This protocol intimately integrates multiple compo-
nents that share data. TSTP was motivated by the problems observed
in WSN and IoT, and aims to deliver directly to the application a data-
centric API, trustfulness, geo-referencing, space-time synchronization
and energy efficiency at the communication level. We chose this pro-
tocol because of its capacity to establish keys after deployment. This
characteristic brings a specification and verification challenge.
We use the ProVerif(BLANCHET et al., 2010) tool to analyze
the security aspects of the TSTP. ProVerif has already demonstra-
ted valuable results for many cryptographic protocols in the litera-
ture(BLANCHET; ABADI; FOURNET, 2005). This tool models attackers
and protocols using applied pi-calculus to describe message exchange.
These descriptions are then converted to Horn clauses and are proven
mechanically using a First-Order Logic theorem prover.
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND RELATED WORK
The design of an authenticationWSN/IoT protocol involves many
critical decisions. We will explain the building blocks needed (§2.2.1)
and two approaches that in our opinion outsource protocol security res-
ponsibilities. The first one is related to protocol assumptions (§2.2.2).
The second one is about the protocol trust relations (§2.2.3).
2.2.1 IoT Cryptographic Algorithms
The selection of the right security algorithm to be used with
WSN/IoT communications is not a trivial task, mainly because of the
constraints related to code and data size, processing power, and energy
consumption(WANG; ATTEBURY; RAMAMURTHY, 2006). Encryption al-
gorithms are classically classified using symmetric or asymmetric cryp-
tography(FAQUIH; KADAM; SAQUIB, 2015). Although this seems trivial,
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it is important to discuss the impact of such choices when dealing with
WSN/IoT protocol designs.
2.2.1.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
This kind of cryptography uses the same key for encryption and
decryption. These cryptographic operations are usually relatively sim-
ple and efficient. RC4, RC5, IDEA, are examples of symmetric crypto-
graphy algorithms.
Because WSN devices must usually manage constrained resour-
ces, the simplicity of symmetric cryptography algorithms is very desi-
rable. The security scheme chosen must not significantly affect the per-
formance of the network(KIRUTHIKA; EZHILARASIE; UMAMAKESWARI,
2015). The selection of algorithms for encryption and decryption to be
employed takes into account parameters such as the size of the ope-
rands, modes of operation, and key expansion. The type of cipher
depends mainly on how large the volume of data is to be processed
through the network. Stream ciphers deal better with large amounts of
information, while for smaller traffic, block ciphers may be a suitable
option.
In this sense it is not only important to choose a symmetric
algorithm, but to choose it based on the context of the data being
collected within the WSN/IoT deployment scenario. A wise decision
is to choose symmetric algorithms that can leverage good hardware
support from the base platform of the nodes.
2.2.1.2 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
This cryptographic concept works with pairs of keys: everything
that one key encrypts the other decrypts and vice-versa. This method
yields more robust cryptographic schemes, but many authors agree that
the required data size, code size, processing time and power consump-
tion generally make this kind of cryptography impractical for WSN/IoT
deployment scenarios (WANG; ATTEBURY; RAMAMURTHY, 2006).
Nevertheless, with the advent of Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) schemes, it has been shown that it is possible to achieve a
good trade off between all these factors and the resulting level of se-
curity provided(WANG; ATTEBURY; RAMAMURTHY, 2006). Although
ECC operations are costly, they achieve the same level of security as
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other asymmetric schemes such as RSA using smaller keys, resulting in
smaller overhead and power consumption(WANDER et al., 2005).
Some special deployment scenarios, especially when the identity
of peers must be attested to the whole network, require the use of
public key cryptography. It is important to note that these algorithms
usually do not come with efficient hardware implementations and they
usually are heavy multiplication based. With ECC we swap integer
modular exponentiation by logical operations representing addition and
multiplication over finite fields.
2.2.2 Pre-established Information Protocols
Wireless Sensor Networks are usually ad-hoc networks. The to-
pology is not fixed or pre-determined, and nodes may enter or leave
the network during its lifetime. Such networks require a dynamic key
assignment, that will use sensors’ data for key generation and esta-
blishment. Thus, the use of pre-distributed information as a strong
parameter on key generation is not advised by literature(RAJESWARI;
SEENIVASAGAM, 2016). The generation of life-long keys at fabrication
time is also not recommended. When doing that, the security root
will stay centered on the institution or company that injected this key
material into the sensor. Hence if there is a data leak, all those who con-
sider this information trustful are potentially compromised. To avoid
that, we prefer to use unique data available only to the sensor and
the sink to provide a key establishment scheme. This strategy we call
pre-established information protocols.
In the literature, several authentication protocols for WSN have
been proposed with the premise of pre-distributed key material. The
Lightweight Dynamic User Authentication Scheme (LDUAS)(WONG et
al., 2006) relies on a previously-defined user name, password and time
period to establish key material. The sensor authenticates to the sink
with this information and the key material is set out of that. So if any
of this data is weak in terms of entropy, or if the attacker gets this info
somehow, the protocol is insecure.
The Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP)
provides multiple mechanisms involving keys, which are capable of pro-
viding confidentiality and authentication(ZHU; SETIA; JAJODIA, 2006)
to messages. This protocol has individual keys shared with the base
station, a pair of keys that can be shared with other Wireless Sensor
Networks, a key to exchange information with neighboring nodes and
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a group key. However all of these mechanisms are mainly based on a
pre-distributed key to create a secure communication channel and to
generate these multiple keys. If someone discovers that key, the attac-
ker will have knowledge about the other keys too. This protocols lacks
a property called forward-secrecy.
The Lightweight Authentication Scheme (LAS) for WSN only
uses an HMAC hash function and a set of encryption algorithms using
symmetric ciphers to provide confidentiality and authenticity to the
messages exchanged(DELGADO-MOHATAR; FÚSTER-SABATER; SIERRA,
2011). This protocol is divided in three phases, starting with the pre-
distribution of keys, explicitly specifying that the manufacturer must
insert a master symmetric key at the time of sensor manufacturing.
Therefore the trust is not only in the manufacturer but also in the
manufacturing process, and even in the employee who carries out the
procedures, because a forgery in any one of these steps can compromise
any network installed with this scheme. The other two phases are
inherently dependent of the first one, making it the main point of failure
for the protocol.
The Node Level Security Policy Framework (NLPSF) uses node
information for authentication and group keys based on identity-based
cryptography(CLAYCOMB; SHIN, 2011). The protocol’s initialization is
divided into four parts, the second of which being the initialization
of the sensor node with a data set. This data set contains public in-
formation representing the group to which this sensor belongs, cha-
racterizing a static group assignment. The data set also contains an
identity-based key. Hence this approach not only relies on the integrity
of pre-deployment information, but also relies on a fixed and pre-defined
network topology, which is generally not suitable to ad-hoc and mobile
wireless networks.
Security protocols based on pre-established static information for
the seeding or derivation of keys for nodes are inherently corruptible
at the time of production of the node. More over, basing the new keys
derived later on the pre-established keys will also lack forward-secrecy
of this key material. Nevertheless, a lot of people opt for such protocols
because they are easy to design and easy to deploy, even if not delivering
ultimate security.
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2.2.3 Trusted Third Party Protocols
The literature contains numerous WSN protocols for authenti-
cation using digital certificates, public key cryptography and shared
key cryptography. The main characteristics of these protocols are that
they rely on the presence of a trusted third party to be the dealer
of the protocol. These protocols can prevent man in the middle at-
tack(MitM), because they can identify the identity of the two sides of
communication. However, these checks may impair the speed of packet
switches or create a bottleneck on the side of the institution responsible
for checking.
The Efficient Authenticated Key Establishment Protocol (EA-
KEP)(VIJAYAKUMAR; VIJAYALAKSHMI, 2008) uses elliptic curve cryp-
tography (ECC), which is recognized in the literature by providing the
desired level of security with smaller keys, low computational comple-
xity and high-speed cryptographic operations. This protocol uses digi-
tal certificates to protect itself from impersonation attacks. Therefore
all nodes must be connected to the Certification Authority (CA) for
testify the identity of this sensor and every message exchanged needs
communication between base station and CA.
The Multiuser Broadcast Authentication scheme (MUBA)(REN
et al., 2009) proposes four methods based on public key cryptography
to provide different benefits and respond to different constraints. No-
netheless there are several methods of implementation for this authenti-
cation scheme. All of them still need an authority (trusted third party)
to certify sensors and answer for their identity. However this protocol
has its importance in literature, because it is not common to present
various certification schemes focused on IoT.
The design of trusted third party protocols in the WSN/IoT
context is not usual. Mostly because it will inherently yield a more
complex deployment scenario, including the new type of peer. Another
big issue with these protocols is that they usually rely on public-key
cryptography, which is very costly to the constrained environment of
the sensors.
In section 2.3 we will be describing the Trustful Space-Time
Protocol (TSTP) (RESNER; FROHLICH, 2015) security features. This
protocol called our attention because it deals with communication and
key establishment using the very efficient schemes of symmetric crypto-
graphy, coupled with once in a life-time use of asymmetric cryptography
for master secret establishment. It does not rely on trusted third par-
ties, and by using a synchronized time seed to generate sessions keys,
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it provides very strong forward-secrecy properties.
2.3 THE TSTP PROTOCOL
The Trustful Space-Time Protocol (TSTP) (RESNER; FROHLICH,
2015) is an application-oriented, cross-layer communication solution for
WSN and IoT, ranging from the application layer to the link layer.
TSTP handles geographic information inherent to the network (such
as time and space) as much as possible, including its key generation
protocol. TSTP defines a key generation protocol between sensor nodes
and a central node (gateway, or sink).
WSN devices communicate through wireless technology, allowing
any radio interface configured at the same frequency band to monitor
or participate in communications – which is very convenient for attac-
kers. In order to avoid attacks, a secure infrastructure must provide the
principles of confidentiality, authenticity and integrity(SUO et al., 2012).
TSTP provides these principles as well as temporality, while not requi-
ring a trustable third party. It relies on unique sensor IDs, precisely
synchronized clocks, and time and place of deployment as information
shared between gateway and sensor.
Although we are mostly interested in the security verification of
the key distribution part of TSTP, the next subsections present some
key components of the cross-layer protocols that are used in the setting
of establishing key material. We will present the time synchronization
scheme (§2.3.1), address and positioning scheme (§2.3.2) and the key
distribution scheme itself (§2.3.3).
2.3.1 Time Synchronization
TSTP’s Speculative Precision Time Protocol keeps clocks in the
network synchronized with sub-microsecond precision(RESNER; FRöH-
LICH; WANNER, 2016). TSTP has two non-exclusive modes of time
synchronization: speculative and explicit. Speculative synchronization
happens every time a node receives a TSTP message. Since TSTP
defines the MAC component that controls directly the physical layer,
and since fine-grained, MAC-level time stamps are pigtailed in every
TSTP message, a receiver of any message can determine its clock offset
in relation to the sender without the exchange of any extra message.
With the reception of at least two messages from the same sen-
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Fig. 1 – TSTP explicit time synchronization.
der, receivers are also able to estimate their frequency error with high
accuracy(RESNER; FRöHLICH; WANNER, 2016). Since clocks in sensor
nodes drift from each other over time (even if once synchronized), spe-
culative synchronization is carried out for every received message, and
its accuracy is proportional to the amount of traffic in the area of the
network in which a given node is located.
The second synchronization mode is used when a node can’t af-
ford to wait for eventual messages to synchronize with a given precision,
and consists of the transmission of an explicit “Time request” message.
This message is replied to by a neighbouring node twice, so that the
requestor node can extract the two time stamps necessary for synchro-
nization. Figure 1 illustrates the explicit mode where Node A requests
synchronization with message m1, which is replied twice by Node B.
In this case, m1 is not only a Time request, but a message destined to
a node to the right, and so it is forwarded normally through Node C.
cN (ti) represents a read on the local clock of node N at physical time
ti.
2.3.2 Addressing and Positioning
TSTP’s location estimation is also done passively on every mes-
sage that a node overhears. The position estimation algorithm is ba-
sed on the Heuristic Environmental Consideration Over Position (HE-
COPs)(REGHELIN; FRÖHLICH, 2006), which uses multilateration and
Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) measurements.
To boost accuracy, HECOPS introduces confidence values and
heuristics to estimate environmental effects on the radio signal, effec-
tively boosting the estimation’s accuracy. Figure 2 depicts the “devia-
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tion” heuristic: when two highly confident nodes (e.g. nodes equipped
with GPS) detect that the RSSI estimation between them is off, they
inform neighbor nodes about this offset, so that they can apply it to
their own estimations. In this figure Node A and B are anchors and
detect that their estimated distance via RSSI is wrong by a coeffici-
ent devAB . They broadcast this information so that C can apply the
same coefficient to its estimations (representing that the area inside the
triangle is under environmental interference).
Fig. 2 – HECOP’s deviation detection.
In TSTP, every message carries the geographic coordinates of
the sender node, such that any node overhearing the network for long
enough may harvest enough information to estimate its own coordinates
without the injection of any extra message. Furthermore, estimation is
done continuously, and its accuracy tends to get better with each new
message overheard.
It is important to note that addressing of nodes within the TSTP
cross-layer protocols is based on their actual position in space. This
makes positioning important to our evaluation because this is how no-
des are addressed in the WSN setting.
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Fig. 3 – Overview of interactions between blocks of TSTP’s key esta-
blishment protocol.
2.3.3 Security
The key bootstrapping protocol can be explained by these se-
quence of events. First it happends a mutual authentication and key
establishment, with an ECDH agreement, between one sensor and the
gateway. After that the next step is a One-Time Password(OTP) ope-
ration using Poly1305. The OTP is sent with the id encrypted by the
id, that is basically the Auth operation. For authentication purposes,
the sink do a database fetch seeking for the correspondant ID, received
as Auth on the last step. When that operation matches with the sto-
red identifiers on the database, the key generated by both sides has a
confirmation that this key was only shared with the real node and the
real sink. After this steps every message exchanged is encrypted using
a new OTP, together with a MAC of the message.
TSTP’s key bootstrapping protocol’s architecture is illustrated
in Figure 3. It involves the Speculative Precision Time Protocol (Sec-
tion 2.3.1) to precisely synchronize clocks; The Heuristic Environmental
Consideration Over Position for addressing the nodes (Section 2.3.2);
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman to establish strong asymmetric key pairs;
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AES for lightweight encryption/decryption of messages; Poly1305-AES
(BERNSTEIN, 2005a) and unique sensor node IDs for authentication via
One-Time Password (OTP);
The Poly1305 is highly indicated by the research area. There
is a proof of security level that we can achieve using this algorithm
(BERNSTEIN, 2005b). Some of the user responsabilities are defined by
Bernestein to maintain the security level. For TSTP the identifier used
on each ID should be unique and the key generated for each device
should be unpredictable, we are using Diffie-Hellman so this conditions
are not a problem for TSTP. The last constraint is that this algorithm
needs a parameter that is used just one time, this is why we used
timestamps.
Figure 4 details the operations carried out by the protocol. Ope-
ration 1 is the part responsible for the choice of Diffie-Hellman para-
meters. The G parameter is the base point of an elliptic curve. The p
variable is a prime that defines Fp, the prime field in which the protocol
operates. n represents the order of the group used, being proportional
to p, and its size will be the size of the keys that will be generated.
The IDs correspond to sensor unique identifiers large enough to be
considered secure.
Operations 2 and 3 are related to the size of the key and its
generation. The private key (Ks) is a random integer less than n and
the public key (Ps) is derived from the multiplication of the private key
value and the base point G. Operation 4 generates a hash value of the
sensor’s ID, which is also known to the gateway.
At step 5, the two interested parties’ clocks are synchronized.
The protocol is agnostic to the exact synchronization method used.
After that the sensor stays waiting for the message of operation 6 (DH
Request) that will come from the gateway with its public key Pg at the
window of time defined for that sensor’s deployment. When the sensor
receives this request, it will send a DH Response message (7) with its
own public key Ps.
The master secretKsg is calculated with the multiplication of the
public key sent through the network and the private key of the sensor
in operation 8. In operations 9, 10, 11, the sensor prepares a One-Time
Password with the Poly1305-AES algorithm(BERNSTEIN, 2005a) using
three inputs: the sensor’s ID, the master secret just established and the
current time. The purpose of this request is to tie the master secret to a
sensor ID, effectively ensuring to the gateway that Ksg was established
with a trusted sensor node. The time stamp included protects this
message from replay attacks.
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Sensor Gateway
IDs, p, n,G, µ (2.1) IDs, p, n,G, µ
ChooseKs < n (2.2) ChooseKg < n
Ps = Ks ∗G (2.3) Pg = Kg ∗G
Auths = {IDs}IDs (2.4) Auths = {IDs}IDs
Clock PTP (2.5) Clock
Pg DH_Request (2.6) Pg
Ps DH_Response (2.7) Ps
Ksg = Ks ∗ Pg (2.8) Ksg = Kg ∗ Ps
MIs = Ksg ⊕ IDs (2.9)
OTPs = Poly(MIs,Ksg, IDs, Ti) (2.10)
Auths, OTPs (2.11) Auth_Request Auths, OTPs
IDs = Query(Auths) (2.12)
MIs = Ksg ⊕ IDs (2.13)
OTP ′s = Poly(MIs,Ksg, IDs, Ti) (2.14)
OTP ′s
?
= OTPs (2.15)
KTsg = Poly(MIs,Ksg, IDs, Ti) (2.16)
{IDs}KTsg (2.17) Auth_Granted {IDs}KTsg
KTsg = Poly(MIs,Ksg, IDs, Ti) (2.18)
Decrypt {IDs}KTsg (2.19)
IDs
?
= IDs (2.20)
Fig. 4 – Protocol Operations.
Upon reception of the Auth Request message, the gateway tests
all the data calculated by the sensor (operations 12 to 15) and then
sends back a confirmation to the sensor if it passes. In operation 12
the gateway verifies in its database if there is an ID that can decrypt
Auths, and the result of this decryption is its own ID. At step 13
another information is calculated on the sink side by using the xor of
the master secret and the ID found in the last step. The next two steps
show that the Auth request information was sent from a valid sensor
to the gateway. After that, in operation 16, the sink asserts that the
authentication was successful sending a confirmation message.
The message contains the sensor’s ID encrypted with a disposa-
ble key, which is derived from the master secret and the ID itself at
operation 17. In the next operation the sensor generates a key with its
own parameters. It then tries to decrypt the Auth Granted message at
operation 19 and finds its own ID in the last operation. This way, it
has evidence that Ksg was in fact shared with a party that knows the
ID, assuming only the gateway this far. At this point, the parties have
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synchronized clocks and shared an authenticated master secret Ksg.
The master secret is not used directly as an encryption key. A
disposable key is generated each time a message is sent, just as in
operations 8 to 10, which is used for encryption. Figure 5 depicts the
process of sending secure messages.
Sensor Gateway
MAC = Poly(MSG,Ksg, IDs, Ti) (2.21)
MIs = Ksg ⊕ IDs (2.22)
KTsg = Poly(MIs,Ksg, IDs, Ti) (2.23)
{MAC,MSG}KTsg (2.24) Send_Message {MAC,MSG}KTsg
MIs = Ksg ⊕ IDs (2.25)
KTsg = Poly(MIs,Ksg, IDs, Ti) (2.26)
Decrypt{MAC,MSG}KTsg (2.27)
MAC ′ = Poly(MSG,Ksg, IDs, Ti) (2.28)
MAC ′ ?= MAC (2.29)
Fig. 5 – Sending a confidential, authenticated, and timed message.
2.4 ACCESS CONTROL IN IOT ENVIRONMENTS
The efforts of the security research area have been directed toward
the design, development and improvement of lightweight security me-
chanisms. The optimizations are focused at the physical, the network
or the application levels, or concentrated into account constrained re-
source availability of smart objects. However, there are important
characteristics of IoT that have been forgotten. For example, hete-
rogeneity, dynamicity and extreme variability of operating conditions.
These features raise security management issues, associated with the
need to dynamically adapt the exploited security mechanisms and en-
forced policies to achieve the best dynamic trade off between overhe-
ad/costs and security levels. Adaptation is a crucial open problem to
address for security management in IoT environments.
From now on, software architectures design focused on IoT en-
vironments, should be prepared for the heterogeneity of smart objects
and networks, and should provide service provision for many different
applications and users on the most diverse contexts(PREUVENEERS;
BERBERS, 2008). Context awareness is important to these infrastruc-
tures because it will allow service customization with minimal human
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intervention (PERERA et al., 2014). Analysing and understanding rele-
vant context data, regarding the user, will be fundamental to originate
a new range of smart entertainment and business applications totally
user-friendly(DEY, 2001).
2.4.1 Literature Review
The management of access control in IoT environments addresses
complex characteristics like their heterogeneity and the high dynamicity
of the smart objects where we can apply policy-based approaches. The
policy management research area was initially focused on large-scale
problems such as enterprise-wide and Internet-wide systems(SLOMAN;
LUPU, 2002)(BOUTABA; AIB, 2007). In these kind of applications, po-
licies have been extracted from observations of network administration
tasks, such as security, recovery, configuration, quality of service, etc.
The policies are defined as means to regulate the behavior of system
components in a dynamic way, without changing any part of the code
and sometimes without any warning system to the components being
governed. Therefore, making adjustments in policies can update or
even change the imposed constraints in order to help the system adapt
itself to environmental conditions.
According to Bradshaw(BRADSHAW; MONTANARI; USZOK, 2014),
there are a number of strategies to define policies and policy languages.
The novel policy languages, in IoT environments, should be able to
ensure a proper level of expressiveness, because when the system has a
wide range of policy requirements it will certainly need a high level of
expressiveness while being efficient at the same time. The enforcement
of access control policies can be applied with different approaches, too,
relying on the limitations of the IoT devices on the network as they
may not have enough computational power to implement complex ac-
cess control mechanisms(ROMAN; ZHOU; LOPEZ, 2013). There is a stan-
dard for policy management frameworks designed by IETF and DMTF.
This pattern is not aimed for IoT, but it should work if the deployment
requirements match the pattern and if the efficient allocation of Policy
Decision Points(PDP) and Policy Enforcement Point(PEP) are distri-
buted following the standard, then any change on that jeopardizes the
performance and scalability of the system.
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3 FORMAL VERIFICATION OF A CROSS-LAYER,
TRUSTFUL SPACE-TIME PROTOCOL FOR
WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
3.1 PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION AND FORMALIZATION
In this section, we specify the Trustful Space-Time Protocol
(TSTP) (RESNER; FROHLICH, 2015) using ProVerif (§3.1.1). Out of
that Specification we conduct a protocol verification assisted by the
tool (§3.1.2).
3.1.1 ProVerif Protocol Specification
Our specification effort was focused on the description and eva-
luation of the security components of TSTP. We specified the secure
key establishment protocols and the later communication process using
the shared keys generated in this first phase.
We initialize our ProVerif specification informing that the chan-
nel where TSTP data pass through is an open channel, vulnerable to
tampering, eavesdropping and other threats. This is a standard proce-
dure that puts the protocol on the setting of a reasonable threat model
for where it will actually be executed.
We then define a unique ID for every sensor and that its size is
at least 128 bits, because it needs a good entropy as well as being hard
to guess. After that we define a timestamp value, which is a parameter
of the one-time-password that avoids the generation of the same key
twice.
The parameters of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) func-
tions are represented by G, x and y exponents. These parameters esta-
blish how hard it will be for the attacker to solve the discrete logarithm
problem for elliptic curves. The security of key derivation is proporti-
onal to the size of elliptic curve keys. We considered that the ECDH
key has at least 256 bits and with that assumption we are able to de-
rive a 128 bit key, that will be used with AES to encrypt and decrypt
messages.
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3.1.2 ProVerif Protocol Verification
We were able to find a security problem related to the time syn-
chronization part of the protocol, as well as a possibility of improvement
in the message authentication scheme. We explain next the main steps
that the ProVerif tool was guided through to find the security flaw. In
the end of this chapter we evaluate the advantages that our proposals
bring to TSTP.
Listing 3.1 – Sensor’s Process
let OTP_t0 = Poly(xor(masterSecret , id), masterSecret , id, t0) in
event sensor_request_auth(id);
out(c, (Auth(id), OTP_t0 ));
As shown in the listing above, the problem was found on the
first sensor’s time synchronization. The flaw is related to the Auth
Request message. At operation 11 (Figure 4), two pieces of data are
sent: the first one is the ID encrypted by itself and the second part is an
unencrypted One-Time Password that is crucial for the attack found.
Within the Proverif specification we were able to find a way for
attackers to impersonate the gateway and send seemingly legitimate
messages to the sensor. To do this, the attacker must follow three
basic steps:
1. Synchronize its clock to the network;
2. Store an Auth Request message from a given sensor s containing
OTPs, as well as the precise time t where it was sent;
3. Wait for an Auth Granted response from the gateway to s;
4. Manipulate the clock synchronization algorithm to make the clock
of sensor s become t again;
5. Send a message to s encrypted with OTPs (stored at step 2), or
read the messages that s sends.
Steps 1 and 4 are generally possible since TSTP does not secure
clock synchronization. In fact, it is not trivial to do so because TSTP
relies on synchronized clocks to provide security in the first place. Step
2 is possible since OTPs goes through the network as plain text. It is
wrong, however, to assume that all plain data that passes through the
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network can cause an easy to see problem: even ProVerif took some
steps to discover the subtle flaw.
An attacker can thus successfully impersonate the gateway to
a sensor node. It cannot, however, impersonate a sensor node to the
gateway if the gateway’s clock is the reference clock for the time syn-
chronization protocol (i.e. the network synchronizes to the gateway’s
clock, and not vice-versa).
Evaluating the protocol we can see another issue that happens
the moment that a message is sent, involving the order of the Message
Authentication Code (MAC) and encryption operations. This was not
actually found by the use of Proverif, but as a result of the reasoning
involved in the specification and verification efforts.
This order is important, with each ordering covering different
properties(BELLARE; NAMPREMPRE, 2008). There are two possible or-
derings:
• The MAC-then-Encrypt (MtE) ordering consists of first genera-
ting a MAC from the plaintext and then encrypting the result.
This provides plaintext integrity and does not leak any informa-
tion about the plaintext (because it is encrypted), but does not
provide any integrity on the ciphertext;
• The Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) order consists of first encrypting
the message, and then generating a MAC from the ciphertext.
This provides integrity of both ciphertext and plaintext, and does
not leak any information on the plaintext, assuming the output of
the cipher appears random and there is no output from the recei-
ving end indicating whether the MAC was valid or not(BELLARE;
NAMPREMPRE, 2008).
Therefore EtM ensures that you only read valid messages. With
this method, if one modifies the ciphertext or tries to extend it, that
will result in an invalid MAC. EtM also protects against the padding
oracle attack(PATERSON; YAU, 2004), because decryption of messages
with invalid MACs are prevented.
3.2 PROTOCOL RE-DESIGN AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
We propose two solutions to this problem. The first one is a
change in the time synchronization algorithm. TSTP is built on top of
an IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer. The 802.15.4 standard dictates that
the oscillator used as clock by radio hardware must have an accuracy of
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at least ±40ppm. Some WSN systems based on this standard (such as
Texas Instruments’ CC2538 SoC1) propagate this accuracy to the sys-
tem clock, so that any node in the network, once synchronized, knows
for every further synchronization operation the upper bound φ¯ of its
drift:
φ¯ = α× (ti − ts)
where α is the oscillator’s accuracy (e.g. 40ppm), ti is the current
time and ts is the time at which the last synchronization happened.
Any synchronization that attempts to adjust the clock by an amount
δ, such that |δ| > |φ¯|, can be detected as violating the physical limit
given by the oscillator’s accuracy, and therefore rejected. This method
drastically limits the attacker’s ability to manipulate the sensor’s clock,
preventing step 4 of the detected attack.
The second solution is to adapt the security protocol itself: TSTP
could use the same messages and data, but with one more instance of
encryption. The OTP that is packaged within the Auth Request mes-
sage could, instead of being transmitted as plain text, be encrypted
by the master secret Ksg that is already established between sensor
and gateway. The rest of the protocol would be carried out identically,
since the gateway already has to try every Ksg pending authentication
in steps 12-15 (Figure 4). This security measure would turn the menti-
oned attack infeasible because we assume that the attacker is not able
to break ECDH in a reasonable time to find Ksg and therefore decrypt
the Auth Request message to find OTPs. Figure 6 shows the proposed
changes.
To use the EtM pattern we will only have to modify the send
message part of the protocol. We will do operations 22 and 23 (Figure
4) before the generation of MAC tag (operation 21 of Figure 4), after
that we will encrypt the message, generate the key to do the encryption
and then we will generate the tag.
Operation 30 (Figure 6) impacts the security level and the sen-
sor’s power consumption. With our improvement the attacker is inca-
pable of impersonating the gateway. However, the sensor has to encrypt
one more data packet at key establishment. Considering that this will
happen one time for each sensor, this impact is amortized by the rise of
the security level. Operation 31 does not affect the protocol, because
its execution is on the gateway side where power consumption is not a
problem.
1www.ti.com/CC2538
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Sensor Gateway
OTPs = Poly(MIs,Ksg, IDs, Ti)
Auths, {OTPs}Ksg (3.1) Auth_Request Auths, {OTPs}Ksg
IDs = Query(Auths)
MIs = Ksg ⊕ IDs
OTP ′s = Poly(MIs,Ksg, IDs, Ti)
{OTP ′s}Ksg ?= {OTPs}Ksg (3.2)
KTsg = Poly(MIs,Ksg, IDs, Ti)
{IDs}KTsg Auth_Granted {IDs}KTsg
KTsg = Poly(MIs,Ksg, IDs, Ti)
Decrypt {IDs}KTsg
IDs
?
= IDs
Fig. 6 – Proposed changes to the key establishment protocol.
3.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work, we provided a formal verification of the security
aspects of the Trustful Space-Time Protocol, an application-oriented,
cross-layer WSN protocol. We specified and verified TSTP’s time
synchronization and key bootstrapping protocols(RESNER; FRÖHLICH,
2015) in the automatic cryptographic protocol verification tool ProVe-
rif.
From the automatic analysis, we were able to find a subtle attack
that would allow an attacker to effectively impersonate the gateway to
a sensor node and read all (assumed) private and authenticated data
it sends. We propose two possible punctual alterations in the protocol
to counter-measure this security flaw, preventing this attack.
Furthermore, we propose another topical change not detected as
a flaw by ProVerif, but that would increase security: the change of a
MAC-then-Encrypt method employed to Encrypt-then-MAC.
In summary we could verify that TSTP uses unique IDs as well
as time and space as implicitly shared information between the parties
during key establishment. Because the protocol does not derive keys
exclusively from the ID, security holds even if they are deployed with
low care (RESNER; FRÖHLICH, 2015). In TSTP, an attacker must not
only find a correct ID, but deploy a malicious node at the right time
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and place(RESNER; FROHLICH, 2015). Moreover, ID leakage does not
compromise any keys already established.
The TSTP uses a pre-distributed identifier on each node, but not
all the security relies on this information(RESNER; FROHLICH, 2015).
The protocol specifies a secured minimum size for that data, making
brute force attacks harder to perform. There is a step where the sink
will be loaded with sensor ids information. This step will allow the base
station to test if the node that is trying to authenticate has a valid id
or not.
The TSTP does not need a Trustable Third Party(TTP) and
certificates to identify who is sending the message. The protocol is not
susceptible to full MitM, because the attacker cannot impersonate a
sensor. To perform a full MitM the attacker needs to impersonate the
gateway to the sensor and then they will exchange a key with each
other. After that the attacker needs to impersonate a sensor, too,
and start to send messages to the base station. However, he can not
impersonate a sensor because he does not know a valid identifier.
As future work, we intend to design an extension for TSTP that
would allow for key distribution within groups. Such groups should be
space-time constrained so that the key establishment and the surroun-
ding protocol would use a mechanism of geo-encryption.
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4 A CONTEXT-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL SCHEME
FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
According to Prognostics (CERP-IOT, 2010) prediction, fifty to
one hundred billion devices will have Internet access close by 2020. By
2025 it is expected (COUNCIL, 2008a) that Internet-connected nodes
will be in human’s every day things, such as food packages, furniture,
paper documents and etc, leading to network of always/intermittently
connected objects in a world-wide scale, i.e., the Internet of Things
(IoT).
One of the major obstacles to wider uptake of the IoT in the
real world is security. IoT security challenges are many and with some
elements of technical originality if compared with other deployment
environments and application domains. The threats that may affect
IoT environments are various and at various levels (physical, applica-
tion, communication, ..), ranging from attacks to the confidentiality,
integrity, and authenticity of communication channels to denial of ser-
vice, identity fabrication, malicious access to objects, and unauthorized
control over IoT entities.
Up to now, related security research efforts have been mostly
directed towards the design and development of lightweight security
mechanisms and optimizations at the physical/network/application le-
vels, by mainly taking into account constrained resource availability of
smart objects. However, the nature of IoT (heterogeneity, dynamicity,
and extreme variability/unpredictability of operating conditions) rai-
ses other relevant security management issues, associated with the need
to dynamically adapt the exploited security mechanisms and enforced
policies to achieve the best dynamic trade-off between overhead/costs
and security levels. Adaptation is a crucial open aspect to address for
security management in IoT environments.
To achieve adaptation, an emerging trend is the adoption of
context-awareness as the guiding principle for supporting adaptive IoT
security management. For example, based on context, such as available
battery, CPU power, type of network connectivity, communication per-
formance indicators (e.g., bandwidth, latency, packet loss), application-
and environment-specific risks, and trust level of interworking compo-
nents, it should be possible to decide which authentication and authori-
zation mechanisms to apply to IoT objects and to drive authentication
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and access-control decisions. In particular, access control for IoT envi-
ronments can greatly benefit from a context-aware approach. Location
(i.e., checking from where users/devices are accessing the services of-
fered by a smart object, either locally or remotely) and other context
information (such as user profiling data, operating environment con-
ditions, and IoT device status) are crucial elements of access control
policies in IoT scenarios.
In context-aware access control models, permissions are typically
associated to specific context: when an entity/object operates in a spe-
cific context, it automatically acquires the ability to perform the set of
permitted actions in the current context. Context-aware policies can be
created and managed without direct reference to potentially numerous
subjects and objects, but only by predetermining which subject/object
context attributes have to be considered for granting/denying access to
resources. Context-aware policies avoid the need for explicit authori-
zations to be directly assigned to individual subjects prior to an access
request, thus paving the way to easier dynamic adaptation of access
control policies.
However, the deployment of context-aware access control models
in real cases has to face several complexity factors, ranging from the
adoption of proper policy definition languages to the design/develop-
ment of suited context management and policy enforcement support.
Among the various issues, one main problem that needs to be addressed
is to verify how violations to context information impact on policy ap-
plicability. Being policies strongly dependent on context information,
it is crucial to control which attacks can comprise context information
leading to policy abuse. Formal analysis is needed to ensure that every
context conditions that are present in policy specifications and that
govern policy applicability of policies are correct.
This paper addresses this issue by applying the ProVerif (BLAN-
CHET et al., 2010) tool to verify the symbolic model of the context-aware
access control model, called Proteus (BOTTAZZI; MONTANARI; TONI-
NELLI, 2007). In the literature (BLANCHET; ABADI; FOURNET, 2005)
ProVerif is known as a automatic cryptographic protocol verifier. This
tool can handle a lot of cryptographic primitives and it accepts un-
bounded sessions with a myriad of messages. It models attackers and
protocols based on pi-calculus and these models are then converted
to Horn clauses, that can be proved mechanically using a First-Order
Logic theorem prover.
Our main contributions in this work are twofold. First we moti-
vate the need for a context-aware access control model within a Smart
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Campus scenario where food at the restaurant may be subsided ba-
sed on other actions from the students, such as having classes on that
day or being above a certain level of attendance, and describe several
examples of needed context-aware access control policies. The depicted
scenario is pictorial and directed to our real campus scenario at our
University, but it can be easily adapted to other ones with reasona-
ble simplicity. Our second contribution is the formal specification and
verification of an adaptive security policy based on Proteus using Pro-
verif. This specification and verification strategy verifies the common
security goals involved in the security policy, such as, confidentiality
of message exchanges, as well as guaranteeing that no leak of sensitive
information occurs. We can also demonstrate with our formalisation
then non-interference of context-changes on the achievement of security
goals. This work on formal verification of the security policy can help
us to understand it better and to check that it is complete and secure.
In the next section of this paper we will see a Section (§4.2) on
Novel Access Control Models for the IoT and Challenges for Verifica-
tion Tools were we cover the necessary related and parallel work to
oursa as well as give some motivation for our work. On Section 4.3
we describe our pictorial Smart Campus scenario where the dynamic
context-aware access control policy is deployed and how it influences
on the IoT device’s behaviour. Section 4.4 brings use cases and secu-
rity policy descriptions to the scenarios presented on Section 4.3. On
Section 4.5 we describe our specification and formalisation strategy for
verifying our security policy goals using Proverif. And finally, on Sec-
tion 4.6 we draw some concluding remarks as well as we summarise
our finding and propose some future work on the field of IoT security
policies and their formal verification strategies.
4.2 NOVEL ACCESS CONTROL MODELS FOR THE IOT AND
CHALLENGES FOR VERIFICATION TOOLS
Heterogeneity, resource constraints, the size, and the high dyna-
micity of IoT environments complicate the engineering and the mana-
gement of access control. Embedded devices need to be low power and
may have limited connectivity. The size of IoT ecosystems require so-
lutions capable of scaling properly with limited overhead and the high
degree of IoT dynamicity requires adaptive security solutions.
IoT is often characterized by high mobility of nodes across diffe-
rent physical/administration domains; IoT devices experience continu-
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ous changing, not only of connectivity conditions and network topolo-
gies, but also in their collaborating peers. Collaborating devices cannot
be statically pre-determined and pre-identified. In such dynamic scena-
rios, a security challenge is how to decide whom to trust in the plethora
of opportunistically encountered entities and how to govern access con-
trol to the resources of collaborating entities. In addition, whereas
traditional distributed systems rely on a relatively static characteriza-
tion of the operating conditions and accessible resources, where changes
are relatively small, rare, or predictable, the continuous modification of
the visibility and availability of collaborating smart objects is the rule
in the IoT.
Novel access control models are needed to properly handle the
new management issues posed by IoT characteristics. A still open de-
bate in the field covers the issue of which access control model can be
considered appropriate for the IoT with only few proposals been put
forward. Among them a very few rely on role-based and attribute-based
models whereas most solutions adopt capability-based models (GUSME-
ROLI; PICCIONE; ROTONDI, 2013). A novel recently emerging trend is
to follow a context-aware policy-based management approach to sepa-
rate subject identities along with their set of attributes from the set of
privileges needed to operate on resources. Coupling context-awareness
with policy-based management can address the security adaptation re-
quirements of IoT ecosystems.
In a context-aware access control approach subjects acquire set
of privileges depending on the context where they operate, not only
on the basis of their identities, or roles, or only static attributes. In
addition, applying the policy-based management approach to IoT en-
vironments can bring the benefits commonly recognised in traditional
Internet systems (SLOMAN; LUPU, 2002; BOUTABA; AIB, 2007).
Policies are defined as means to regulate the behavior of system
components in a dynamic way, without changing any part of the code
and sometimes without any warning system to the components being
governed. Therefore making adjustments in policies can update or even
change the imposed constraints in order to help the system to adapt it-
self to environmental conditions. According to Bradshaw (BRADSHAW;
MONTANARI; USZOK, 2014), there are a number of different strategies
to define policy languages. The novel policy languages, in IoT envi-
ronments, should be able to ensure a proper level of expressiveness,
because when the system has a wide range of policy requirements it
will certainly need a high level of expressiveness being efficient at the
same time.
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The scenarios where we will deploy our context-aware access con-
trol policy will involve money payments for meals as well as attendance
control at university level. Both of these requirements are too sensitive
for using standard strategies such as observations and failures. We need
a formal verification approach to guarantee the soundness of the policy
before deployment. We also have a requirement for having the policy
to dynamically adapt itself (values of meal) based on other contexts
captured by our smart campus infrastructure.
There are not tools designed specific to perform the access con-
trol policies formal verification, but there are verification tools for pro-
tocol analysis that can be used for this purpose. These tools help the
design of security protocols to be less error prone inserting them on
promiscuous environment. This insertion make it possible to apply
access control policies on the worst contexts scenarios and it shows
how secure the policy is. We looked at three automatic tools Tama-
rin, TA4SP and Proverif. Tamarin seems to be slower than Proverif
for secrecy and authentication purposes, because of its modelling gra-
nularity that implies in a more complex analysis(LAFOURCADE; PUYS,
2015). The TA4SP tool has problems to deal with exclusive-or pro-
perties and its efficiency is slower than Proverif too. Therefore for this
work we choose to work with Proverif knowing that it is not a tool
made for access control policy verification, but it is capable of analyse
the policy execution as a protocol.
4.3 SMART CAMPUS SCENARIOS
In our university it was detected that the students were having
serious attendance problems in the classroom but the same thing could
no be said for the university restaurant. The university restaurant is
maintained by university administration and it has a meal subsidy for
students. This subsidy can reduce the meal cost to less than U$0.50
per meal.
The two main problems we have then are: the low attendance
for classes, and the misuse of university cards for access to the sub-
sided restaurant. The university then decided to add two new access
control systems using an existing Smart Campus strategy, which are
a in-classroom racket for controlling attendance and rackets for access
control and charge at the university restaurant.
Nowadays they operate independently only allowing for beha-
vioural data collection from the users. Our intention is to devise an
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adaptive context-aware access control policy that would allow for dy-
namically controlling the subsidy for the restaurant based on other
campus activities, such as class attendance. This policy must be sub-
ject of a formal verification strategy because it will involve the money
charge for the restaurant, as well as to minimize the impact on the user
in case of policy conflicts.
4.3.1 Use Cases Description
For the sake of simplicity we can consider two students presents
in the use cases Alice and Bob. Alice is a student that has classes in
the morning until middle-day and right after lunch time. Hence she
has to have lunch really fast, because she had to attend classes in the
morning, after that she has to queue to have lunch at the university
restaurant and she has to attend classes in the afternoon too. Bob is a
student that only has classes in the morning and he usually eats at the
university restaurant. Alice and Bob have very different approaches for
attending lectures. Alice goes to all the lectures and do not skip any,
she may even skip lunch to be able to get to class 5 minutes before the
starting time. Bob intermittently misses some classes. He often arrives
late and leaves early. Bob never skip a cheap lunch at the university
restaurant.
4.3.2 Requirements and Design Guidelines
To properly describe the scenarios later on, the university ad-
ministration has given us a set of requirements and design guidelines
for the new context-aware access control scheme. These were not our
choices, but administrative guidelines given to us. They are:
1. The university should be able to limit the the subsidy given on
student meals provided by the restaurant service based on diffe-
rent contexts.
2. We need a way to determine presence of the student inside the
classroom and use this in our context.
3. The students should have an identification card for their authen-
tication within university access control systems, as well as, to
carry a money transaction with the university restaurant.
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4. The policy in place should assure fairness and only be deployed
with the correct assurances that no student will be charged more
than specified on university regulations.
5. There should be not obvious way to subvert the policy either to
get better attendance ratio, as well as getting more subsidy.
Although we are only demonstrating in this work the class atten-
dance context, the actual university scenario is much more complex. It
includes the ability of the student not being able to use his card twice
per meal service, avoiding the card being lent to other. It also may
change the charge based on other IoT collected data, such as parking
use, day of the week and weather conditions. We are leaving some of
the complex IoT integration behind and only focusing on demonstrating
the feasibility of our context aware model approach.
All the hardware for policy deployment was already in place.
The restaurant rackets and the classroom rackets are using the an IoT
communication protocol and deal with mifare cards, as well as they take
photos of the users at each card touch so that fraud can be detected.
University is aware of mifare cards attacks(GARCIA et al., 2008), but
the legacy of 50.000 issued cards puts its change out of scope for now.
The main tasks given to us were to devise the access control
policy and to formally verify it against security goals.
4.3.3 University Restaurant Case
On subsection (4.3.4) we will describe a scenario of a University
restaurant that serves subsided meals for students and is controlled
under a Smart Campus infrastructure based on IoT motes. This res-
taurant serves more than 11.000 meal a day and is one of the main
social policies drivers for our university.
We then present some other ideas in the Smart Campus domains
(§4.3) where we can see that IoT and our proposed Context-Aware
Access control Scheme can be applied. These scenarios allows for the
application of some direct social policies within the university as well
as to understand how the campus behaves as a whole.
56
4.3.4 Access Control to a University Restaurant in a Smart
Campus Setting
We chosen a setting we have available at our university which
is a University Restaurant that serves subsided food to students and
staff under certain conditions. The subsidy varies from 100% to 0%
depending rules established by the university.
4.3.4.1 User Groups
Students that have classes everyday all day long are allowed the
highest subsidy (90%). These students need to be enrolled on lectures
during the morning and the afternoon or the afternoon and the night
since the restaurant servers lunch and dinner. This group of students
is considered not to have the right conditions to pursue other meal
elsewhere. It is important to say regarding this group of students that
enrollment does not mean attendance, what would actually be the a
fairer criteria the university would like to use.
We also have students that are enrolled on lectures everyday
only one period a day. These students are allowed a 75% subsidy. This
group has the same motivation for the subsidy as the previous. Also
enrollment does not mean attendance. This group has also a peculiarity
that they may be enrolled only partially on the period, meaning they
may start mid-morning or mid-afternoon. In this late case, they should
carry the subsidy for the the dinner instead of lunch. The other meal
has 60% subsidy.
We have another group of students that are enrolled less than
four days a week. This group of students are allowed a 60% subsidy
on the days they have lectures and 30% on the other days. The same
rules regarding enrollment versus attendance are present here. There
is no differentiation on whether the student is enrolled all day or part
time.
We have a fourth group of students which are those considered
economically vulnerable that are allowed a 100% subsidy on all their
meals, on the rule they keep attendance above 75%. In fact the 75%
attendance rule is valid for all the four groups, meaning the student
must be attending lectures on a regular basis to have the right for the
subsidy. Drop outs with valid enrollment, or students on any sort of
leave are not allowed to have access to the restaurant.
Another class of users for the University restaurant are adminis-
57
trative and academic staff. This group of users is allowed a single meal
a day with a 70% subsidy. There is not other rule regarding this group
of users.
Finally we have the group of temporary contractors and general
visitors or users of the university community services. This group of
users are not allowed any subsidy, meaning they have to pay full price.
It is important to notice that full price in the University restaurant is
very attractive, since the university aims no profit on those meals. This
group only need to be registered with the University Restaurant where
that access conditions will be assessed by the managerial staff of the
restaurant and will be set for this group.
There are also some system wide rules for accessing the Uni-
versity restaurant that are also encoded on our access control policies:
Only one subsided meal is allowed per user per meal time, avoiding
that the user lends his card to someone else. The security officers that
monitors the access rackets need to perform identity matching for the
ownership of the card that allows for access.
4.3.4.2 IoT Infrastructure in Place
The university restaurant has a physical access and credit control
system which is integrated to the other ICT systems using an wireless
sensor network (WSN) setting. This WSN setting is composed by a
series of IoT motes that communicate between themselves and an In-
ternet connected sink to establish the enforcement of the access control
and charging rules we described above. In this work we consider IoT
objects acting either as sensors or actuators and communicating via wi-
reless communication technologies, thus constituting a Wireless Sensor
Network (WSN).
The access control system is mainly based on the usage of MiFare
(GARCIA et al., 2008) cards from NXP. To add credit to these cards the
users should go to an on-line system and request the adding of the
amount they want by purchasing it on-line. These credit will be added
to their card on their next interaction with the system.
Although we know the security issues of MiFare cards (GARCIA et
al., 2008), this was part of a legacy system, and all the precaution were
taken to avoid attacks. These precaution include the diversification of
card keys using a Key Derivation Function for the card, the usage of
application specific keys for read-only and read-and-write access privile-
ges and the use of back-office processing to validate the credits system.
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This is standard industry procedure when using MiFare cards.
At each of the entrances for the university restaurant there are
a series of access rackets that are used to physically control the access
to the restaurant. To these access rackets the user must present his
MiFare card, which hold the information to start the access control
decision procedure. These access rackets are instrumented with IoT
motes that execute a variation of the TSTP protocol(RESNER; FRÖH-
LICH, 2015). The Trustful Space-time Protocol(TSTP) the university
choose to work with is an application-oriented, cross-layer communi-
cation protocol with accurate time synchronization, heuristic spatial
localization and distribution of sink-node keys. TSTP was motivated
by the needs observed in WSN and IoT, and its target to deliver direc-
tly to the application a data-centric API, trustfulness, geo-referencing,
space-time synchronization and energy efficiency at communication le-
vel. The main choice for this protocol is because it is capable of esta-
blishing security keys after deployment of the system and it comes with
a formal specification using Proverif (SILVA et al., 2016b).
These smart access rackets operate using a ad-hoc communica-
tion scheme based on the zig-bee protocol and forward information
towards a sink that is interconnected with the on-line university sys-
tems for credit management and for attendance. For resilience of the
whole systems, each smart access racket also holds a local partial im-
plementation of the access control policy so that in the event of loss
of communication, either within the ad-hoc network, or the university
systems, the racket can operated independently and fairly allow for the
users to enter the restaurant. The infrastructure is shown on Figure 7.
It is important to note that some rules apply dynamically to
the system and that information is first managed locally. For example
the rule regarding one subsided meal per meal time can be determined
within the IoT network events if the connection with the university
systems is down. This requires a special encoding in terms of access
control rules.
Another important requirement fulfilled by this IoT infrastruc-
ture is that it needs to provide timeliness for the operations, since we
provide the security officer now with a screen where the photos of the
users are shown when the card is read. In this sense he does not need
to randomly choose some users to check identity, since it is automated
and can be done for everybody.
We also have in our deployed Context-Aware Access Control a
scheme to collect data thought a series on IoT connected terminals (also
rackets) where students register their attendance. With the attendance
59
Fig. 7 – Smart Campus scenario.
data collected we were able to establish some interesting context-aware
access restrictions. The attendance registration terminal are on the
student entrance door of some lecture rooms and is used for the student
to register his/her entrance and exit to get the minimum attendance
requirement for our courses.
The class attendance is now one scenario in place, but the uni-
versity is studying others. Some other data collection points that can
increase or decrease subsidy for the university restaurant may be the
use of car parking space (decrease the subsidy), or using carpool par-
king spaces (increasing subsidy).
4.4 USE CASES AND POLICY DESCRIPTION
In this section we briefly lay down the use cases for our context-
aware access control policy and work over the policy description before
doing the formalisation in the next section.
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4.4.1 Use Cases
The use cases described down below were important to built our
access control policy. With this info we could split what should have
in each context element. Therefore the sentences are:
• A student that pass his smartcard on the racket in classes en-
trance and after the authentication the racket can confirm that
his position inside the classroom was confirmed for at least 30
minutes, confirming class attendance.
• A student that attended to classes in the period(morning or after-
noon) and he has classes all day long, he is allowed to eat(lunch
AND dinner) in university restaurant with 90% subsidy.
• A student that attended to classes in the period(morning or af-
ternoon) and he has classes only in one period, he is allowed to
eat(lunch OR dinner) in university restaurant with 75% subsidy.
• A student that attended to classes in a period(morning or after-
noon) and he has classes less than four days a week, he is allowed
to eat(lunch or dinner) in university restaurant with 60% subsidy
on classes days.
• A student that attended to classes in the period(morning or after-
noon) and he has classes less than four days a week, he is allowed
to eat(lunch or dinner) in university restaurant with 30% subsidy
on days without classes.
• A student that is economic vulnerable has the right to eat(lunch
or dinner) in university restaurant with 100% subsidy.
• Administrative and academic staff users are allowed to eat a single
meal in university restaurant with 70% subsidy.
• A group of temporary contractors and general visitors or users of
the university community services are not allowed to any subsidy,
they have to pay full price to to eat(lunch or dinner) in university
restaurant.
Gathering the information of this use cases we can accomplish
access control properties and the policy description. We did not im-
plemented every piece of content because the tool used for analyse our
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policy model is limitant on expressivity, but it can be used for un-
bounded sessions. Therefore the next step was to specify our context
elements and after that do the formal analysis.
4.4.2 Policy Description
The policy model description resulted from the use cases’s abs-
traction and we had to make a few changes on that model targetting
the formal analysis. Firstly we abstracted the required roles, conside-
ring that students, academic staff and administrative staff should be
differentiated. Secondly we thought about the IoT devices present on
our symbolic model environment, this part we could follow two appro-
aches, one way was to create a myriad of representational devices or we
could stick with the most representative ones. The tool used to do the
policy verification it is powerfull, but has its own limits, so we had to
built a description thinking about that too.
We differentiated the roles using identifiers and we generalize
them to just one process. We applied the University diversification
operation to generate identifiers that discriminate roles in our model.
We could have one process per role, but this would make the formal
analysis part take much more time and computational power. Therefore
we generalize the attributes and data behind a role to build a requestor
process that encompasses everything.
We started our symbolic model with two required IoT devices
that are the class racket and the restaurant racket. The Class Racket
was required to characterize one of the contexts that our context-aware
system should judge. The Restaurant Racket represents the IoT device
responsible for charge the requestor with less or more subsidy. However
after the implementation of this two devices as two different processes
we found similarities between these things and other IoT devices, for
example if we need to describe a gadget that will count how many
litters of water each student is drinking, we could represent with the
same description of class racket process just changing a few things.
We ended up having four things as context that are the atten-
dance, the requestor’s campus, amount of credit and the role. The
attendance is verified by the class racket and it could be read by res-
taurant racket. The campus and role identifiers are granted on the
moment that the student’s card is issued. The credit could be acquired
at restaurant’s racket and after the subsidy analysis it could be sub-
tracted according to University scenario rules. So now that the policy
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features were listed and it has a symbolic model better abstracted, we
could specify it using the Proteus model and do the formal analysis.
4.5 POLICY SPECIFICATION AND FORMALIZATION
We split the Smart Campus Model into several properties, we
will explain how we abstracted that and how TSTP helped us. There
are properties involving user location, class and work attendance and
authentication devices. We shrunk the Smart Campus model in a cer-
tain way that made the formal model easier and clear to be understood
by Proverif. The obstacles on gathering precisely time and location
were reduced by using TSTP features.
4.5.1 Access Control Policy Specification
To fully understand the solution to be proposed, let us briefly
recall some characteristics of the underlying Proteus model (BOTTAZZI;
MONTANARI; TONINELLI, 2007). Proteus is a semantic context-aware
policy model that is centered around the concept of context as the
key element of policy specifications, where context means any charac-
terizing information about controlled system entities and about their
surrounding world. Contexts act as intermediaries between entities and
the set of operations that they can perform on resources. In the Proteus
model a policy is a rule that defines, for each context, how to operate on
its associated resources. In particular, policies can be viewed as one-to-
one associations between contexts and allowed actions. Contexts are
associated with the resources to be controlled and represent all and
only those conditions that enable access to resources. Hereinafter we
call protection contexts the contexts that allow operations on resources.
In particular, a protection context consists of all the characterizing data
and meta-data that is considered relevant for access control, logically
organized in parts that describe the state/properties of the resource to
protect (resource context), the characteristics/properties of the entities
requesting access to the resource (requestor context), such as their ro-
les, identities or security credentials, and time conditions, such as the
interval time allowed for operating on the resource (time context).
We subdivided requestor context into three main context ele-
ments that are physical, computing and user. The first one is concer-
ned about the things physically related to the requestor, like time and
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space. This part was made it easier by the properties already available
with TSTP. The second one refers to the devices that a user has with
him or that he will activate. The third one characterize a person, like
the correspondent identifiers and personal information about the sub-
ject. In this work the Protection Context and the Resource Context
will be important too, the protection element is triggered when the
requestor context properties matches the resource element constraints.
Fig. 8 – Physical Context Specification
The specification of our context-aware access control policy starts
with the Physical Context shown on Figure 8. This context element is
composed by Geo-location properties, that involves not only location
but time too. The concepts within this element are represented in Pro-
verif by campusID identifier and it is verified on every operation that
the requestor done. A practical example could be if some student is in
a different campus trying to get lunch, he can’t get the greater subsidy
even attending to class, because in the policy context a requestor has
major discounts only on the campus that issued his IDs.
Fig. 9 – Computing Context Specification
The second specification part was about the Computing context
and is shown on Figure 9. This element was represented at the sym-
64
bolic model as a smart card that has credits on it. The smart card
and restaurant tickets are represented by creditsAtCard variable. This
variable can only be written or read by restaurant’s racket otherwise
any other interested entity could change credit quantities. We imposed
that to make our policy centralized within the restaurant racket, there
are other kind of data written by others entities, but the restaurant
racket can still see and update this datum.
Fig. 10 – User Context Specification
The third specification part refers to the User context as shown
in Figure 10. We implemented this element with almost fully represen-
tation of all sub-elements shown in picture 10. We did that because
in an access control scheme the user or in our case the requestor will
respect or disrespect every single policy rule. This is the element that
will have different contexts and it will impact in our context-related in
how good is our policy context-awareness.
Our protection context element can be described joining the re-
levant variables for trigger restaurant’s subsidy that is our resource ele-
ment. The first one protects our application and the University against
resource waste. The second one is only enjoyed if the set of requestor
attributes follow the protection context rules. The rules are explained
with the formalization of our access control policy. We will give a brief
explanation about how does the proverif code works.
4.5.2 Proverif Code
We are assuming the reader is not proficient in Proverif, so we
bring a brief explanation of its operational semantics. For those versed
on applied pi-calculus and Proverif syntax, this section can be skipped.
In Proverif we can create types, execute all logic operations, and
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we can execute some arithmetic operations too. All these operations
can send results through public and private channels. We are also
allowed to subdivide the process execution into smaller ones to get the
granularity we want. We should define queries for verifying if a secret
data remains secret and other properties we want to verify. The user
can define how the flow of events should happen and how the events
can be co-related.
All the types and constants necessary for the formal verification
should be created at the begining of the script. For defining a type
using proverif language the user needs to just write "type X "being x
the name of this type. To declare a constant the user should inform
explicitly the type, for example "const y: X "meaning that y is a cons-
tant of type X. To declare variables the syntax is "free name:Type",
but if you want to define this variable as secret you should use "free
name:Type[private]"for example. After types declarations of functions
can be created.
A funcion in Proverif should have parameters and a return value.
A function that accepts a string and key as a parameter, and it returns
string can be declared as "fun funname(string,key): string". For calling
functions you just need the name of the function and the data required
as parameter. There are some special functions that do not need to be
declared as input(in) and output(out) functions. When needed by the
user to pass information through channels these functions can be called
as "in(channel,data)". However sometimes you need to do attributions
and “if"statements to keep the flow of your application as intended.
If and else statements are declared in the same way as in other
programming languages. Proverif allows the user to test multiple logic
operations with boolean algebra. The variable attribution follow the
same rules plus a prefix "let", for example "let variable = value". There
is another way that is attributing random value to a variable like "new
value:int". The flow of the executions for the specification is controlled
by events.
Events exists to control the flow of the specification and que-
ries inform to Proverif what should be tested. If for some reason
the security protocol or security policy you are testing needs to fol-
low a specific sequence of events, you can chain them with "event(one)
===>event(two)". A query can be declared as "query attacker(data)" me-
meaning that, all the effort done by Proverif attacker should target to
obtain "data". After these explanations we can easily explain our im-
plementation’s decisions at policy formalisation.
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4.5.3 Threat Modelling
Proverif being mainly used in cryptographic protocol verification
assumes a threat model base on the Dolev-Yao specification (DOLEV;
YAO, 1983). The Dolev-Yao attacker has full control of the setting
where he is in. He is able to learn everything that is exchanged between
other peers, being also capable of intercepting, forging and blocking the
delivery of any communication. The attacker can also play as an insider
to gain knowledge in one run and leverage that in another. The Dolev-
Yao attacker is only constrained by cryptography and he can not guess
random numbers.
In our smart campus setting this attacker is probably the ona
that would be able to derive the most of the attacks that could be con-
ceived, including standard man-in-the-middle and oracles attacks. So
it makes sense to verify our context aware polices against it. Moreover,
it is the advisable to demonstrate that no leak of private information
happens, and well as not interference from an attacker can occur in the
security policy setting. This will help us to verify the security of the
context-aware policy.
4.5.4 Access Control Policy Formalization
We focused our specification on getting the best policy represen-
tation and we prioritised relevant responses for the formalisation. We
evaluated in each step if the formal description was as close as possible
to our policy primitives. However some results could not be proved in
Proverif, so we had to manage to demonstrate that the right operations
happened on the right time showing a good response without the actual
result value.
In Proverif the first thing that should be done is the definition of
communication channel and after that the definition of some auxiliary
functions. We start specification on Proverif with the public channel
where the messages will pass through, that can be tampered, it is sus-
ceptible to eavesdrop and other threats as explained in the previous
section. The functions necessary for the entire proof are subdivided
in Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), Symmetric Encryption and
some conceptual arithmetic functions.
The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) will be represented
by G, x and y exponents and it is analogue to one the University uses
in the real scenario. All these values define how hard it will be to solve
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the discrete logarithm problem on the attacker side. We mainly use
the ECDH to simulate a University process called diversification. This
operation creates a unique key based on subject’s card serial number.
The security of this key derivation is proportional to the size of elliptic
curve keys and these will be used to encrypt or decrypt data on our
formal description.
We implemented the symmetric encryption and decrytion functi-
ons following the description on ProVerif’s manual(BLANCHET; SMYTH;
CHEVAL, 2015) and we added extra functions. These functions were ap-
plied with integer values and in a certain way with boolean values. It
was also required to use a type converter, which is also described in the
Proverif manual. Our specification of the algorithms and the converter
is shown in Listing 4.5.4.
Listing 4.5.4-1 – Diffie-Hellman and Symmetric Encryption
1 (***** Diffie -Hellman *****)
2 type G.
3 const g : G [ data ] .
4 fun exp (G, exponent ) : G.
5 equation forall x:exponent , y:exponent ; exp(exp(g, x), y) = exp(exp(g, y), x).
6
7 fun G_as_key(G) : key [data , typeConverter ].
8
9 (***** Symmetric Encryption *****)
10
11 fun senc(int , key) : bitstring.
12 fun sdec(bitstring , key) : int.
13
14 fun bsenc(bool , key) : bitstring.
15 fun bsdec(bitstring , key) : bool.
16
17 equation forall m : bool , k : key; bsdec(bsenc(m, k), k) = m.
18 equation forall m : bitstring , k : key; bsenc(bsdec(m, k), k) = m.
19
20 equation forall m : int , k : key; sdec(senc(m, k), k) = m.
21 equation forall m : bitstring , k : key; senc(sdec(m, k), k) = m.
We then described the requestor process looking for to the cre-
dits that any requestor had and, if he attended or not to a necessary
appointment which could be a class or work. The creditsAtCard is
a value encrypted by the restaurant racket’s key, so this variable can
travel through the public channel without problems. The attendance-
AtCard is a boolean value encrypted by classes racket’s key, it will be
further explained why this maintains the centralized approach at res-
taurant’s racket. It is shown in Listing 4.5.4 how the first write in the
two variables happens. It is important to remember that demonstra-
ting the actual value of creditsAtCard is different from the new value
it is enough to show that the variable was updated and the same works
for attendance control.
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Listing 4.5.4-2 – Requestor Process
1 let requestor(sk:exponent , id:ID , roleID:G,campusID:G)=
2 (* Requestor Key Generation *)
3 phase 1;
4 let pkRequestor = exp(g,sk) in
5 out(c, pkRequestor );
6
7 (*First Credits Value*)
8 phase 2;
9 in(c,( creditsEncrypted:bitstring ,id_req:ID , req_CampusID:G));
10 if id_req = id && campusID = req_CampusID then
11 let creditsAtCard = creditsEncrypted in
12
13 (*First Attendance Value*)
14 phase 3;
15 in(c,( attendanceValue:bitstring ,id_areq:ID , att_CampusID:G));
16 if id_areq = id && campusID = att_CampusID then
17 let attendanceAtCard = attendanceValue in
18
19 (*Class Authentication *)
20 phase 4;
21 out(c,( creditsAtCard ,attendanceAtCard ,id,roleID ,campusID ));
22
23 (* Attendance Update *)
24 phase 5;
25 in(c,( newRequestorAttendance:bitstring , id_class:ID, classCampusID:G));
26 if id_class = id && campusID = classCampusID then
27 if attendanceAtCard <> newRequestorAttendance then
28 event attendanceUpdate(id);
29
30 (* Restaurant Authentication *)
31 phase 6;
32 out(c,( creditsAtCard ,attendanceAtCard ,id,roleID ,campusID ));
33
34 (* Credits Update *)
35 phase 7;
36 in(c,( newRequestorCredits:bitstring , id_s:ID, reqCampusID:G));
37 if id_s = id && campusID = reqCampusID then
38 if creditsAtCard <> newRequestorCredits then
39 event creditUpdate(id_s).
We also specified the attendance racket process keeping the cen-
tralized architecture approach. We made it capable of judging when
the requestor attended or not the appointment required by the context-
aware access control policy. The process starts with two exchange of
ECDH keys, one to have a unique key to handle the requestor infor-
mation and other to assure that every thing that was done by this
racket can still be read by restaurant’s racket. Therefore the context
behind the attendance evaluation is that, if the requestor is a student
and if it is on the right campus, then the attendance will be true, this
can be observed at Listing 4.5.4. In our specification we just crea-
ted rackets for classes, but it can be generalized to compose all the
others appointments that the University is interested in monitory for
the context-aware access control.
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Listing 4.5.4-3 – Class Racket Process
1 let attendanceracket(sk:exponent ,stuRoleID:G, campusID:G)=
2
3 (** Key Generation **)
4 phase 1;
5 let pkClassRacket = exp(g,sk) in
6 in(c,( pkRequestor:G,idRequestor:ID));
7 let classRacketMasterSecret = G_as_key(exp(pkRequestor , sk)) in
8
9 phase 2;
10 in(c,( pkOtherRacket:G,idOtherRacket:ID));
11 let racketToRacketMasterSecret = G_as_key(exp(pkOtherRacket , sk)) in
12 insert rackets_and_keys(racketToRacketMasterSecret ,idOtherRacket );
13
14 phase 3;
15 new attendance:bool;
16 let firstAttendance = bsenc(attendance ,classRacketMasterSecret) in
17 out(c,( firstAttendance ,idRequestor ,campusID ));
18 (* Attendance Authentication *)
19 phase 4;
20 in(c,( creditsAtCard:bitstring ,attendanceAtCard:bitstring ,id_req:ID ,roleID:G,req_CampusID:G));
21 get authentications_and_keys(classRacketMasterSecret , =id_req) in
22 event classAuth(id_req );
23
24
25 (* Attendance Update *)
26 if roleID = stuRoleID && campusID = req_CampusID then
27 let totalAttendance = true in
28 let encryptedTotalAttendance = bsenc(totalAttendance ,classRacketMasterSecret) in
29 out(c,( encryptedTotalAttendance , id_req ));
30 event attendingClass(id_req)
31 else
32 let noneAttendance = false in
33 let encryptedNoneAttendance = bsenc(noneAttendance ,classRacketMasterSecret) in
34 out(c,( encryptedNoneAttendance , id_req )).
We then started the specification of the restaurant racket pro-
cess exchanging keys with all other entities . The end of this process
shows our context aware concerns. We designed this procedure in a
key-diversified fashion, since the racket should have one key to com-
municate with each related entity. After initializing the key values, we
implemented the requestor authentication, searching for the correspon-
dent key on racket database. With the right key this racket is able to
decrypt the sensitive information and analyse whether the subsidy is
total, partial or none. In this analysis the racket should seek for the
attendance racket key, but in a separate database, so that the search
for keys could be parallel. Therefore the critical constraints that cha-
racterize our policy as a context-aware access control policy are shown
in Listing 4.5.4.
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Listing 4.5.4-4 – University Restaurant Process
1 let ruracket(sk:exponent ,stuRoleID:G,acdRoleID:G,admRoleID:G,campusID:G)=
2 (** Key Generation between Requestor & RuRacket **)
3 phase 1;
4 let pkRacket = exp(g,sk) in
5 in(c,( pkRequestor:G,idRequestor:ID));
6 let racketMasterSecret = G_as_key(exp(pkRequestor , sk)) in
7 insert authentications_and_keys(racketMasterSecret ,idRequestor );
8
9 (** Key Generation between RuRacket & ClassRacket **)
10 phase 2;
11 in(c,( pkOtherRacket:G,idRacket:ID));
12 let racketToRacketMasterSecret = G_as_key(exp(pkOtherRacket , sk)) in
13 insert rackets_and_keys(racketToRacketMasterSecret ,idRacket );
14
15 (*First Requestor Credits Value*)
16 phase 3;
17 new value:int;
18 let firstCredit = senc(value ,racketMasterSecret) in
19 out(c,( firstCredit ,idRequestor ,campusID ));
20
21 (* Authentication to use tickets *)
22 phase 4;
23 in(c,( creditsAtCard:bitstring ,attendanceAtCard:bitstring ,id_req:ID ,roleID:G,req_CampusID:G));
24 get authentications_and_keys(racketAndRequestorMasterSecret ,= id_req) in
25 event restaurantAuth(id_req );
26 let requestorCredits = sdec(creditsAtCard , racketAndRequestorMasterSecret) in
27
28
29 get rackets_and_keys(classMasterSecret , =idRacket) in
30 let attendance = bsdec(attendanceAtCard , classMasterSecret) in
31
32 (* Subsidy Analysis and Credit Update *)
33 if attendance = true && campusID = req_CampusID then
34 if roleID = stuRoleID then
35 let updatedStuCredits = ticketSubtraction(requestorCredits) in
36 event creditPayment(idRequestor );
37 let encryptedStuCredits = senc(updatedStuCredits ,racketAndRequestorMasterSecret) in
38 out(c,( encryptedStuCredits , id_req ));
39
40 if roleID = acdRoleID then
41 let updatedAcdCredits = ticketSubtraction(ticketSubtraction(requestorCredits )) in
42 event creditPayment(idRequestor );
43 let encryptedAcdCredits = senc(updatedAcdCredits ,racketAndRequestorMasterSecret) in
44 out(c,( encryptedAcdCredits , id_req ));
45
46 if roleID = admRoleID then
47 let updatedAdmCredits = ticketSubtraction(ticketSubtraction(ticketSubtraction(requestorCredits ))) in
48 event creditPayment(idRequestor );
49 let encryptedAdmCredits = senc(updatedAdmCredits ,racketAndRequestorMasterSecret) in
50 out(c,( encryptedAdmCredits , id_req ))
51 else
52 let updatedCredits = ticketSubtraction(ticketSubtraction(ticketSubtraction(requestorCredits ))) in
53 event creditPayment(idRequestor );
54 let encryptedCredits = senc(updatedCredits ,racketAndRequestorMasterSecret) in
55 out(c,( encryptedCredits , id_req )).
The last step showed in Listing4.5.4 was to execute all processes
and to do the queries.
The Proverif tool needs to execute the process to understand
how to perform the formal proof. Here we defined that each reques-
tor has its own identifier and that information on a practical example
would stay on a card. Each one of the roles uses an specific id too.
This is important for differentiating the requestors on context analysis.
The same idea for roles was applied for campus identifiers, this covers
the geolocated information needed to unlock maximum discount. The
exclamation mark before some entity means to Proverif that it should
simulate the entity with unbounded number of examples.
71
Listing 4.5.4-5 – Process Execution
1 (* Requestor 1*) new skS1:exponent;
2 (* Requestor 2*) new skS2:exponent;
3 (* Requestor 3*) new skS3:exponent;
4 new skR:exponent;new skCR:exponent;
5
6 new skStu:exponent;new skAcd:exponent;new skAdm:exponent; new skCampusOne:exponent;new skCampusTwo:exponent;
7 let stuRoleID = exp(g,skStu) in
8 let acdRoleID = exp(g,skAcd) in
9 let admRoleID = exp(g,skAdm) in
10 let campusOneID = exp(g,skCampusOne) in
11 let campusTwoID = exp(g,skCampusTwo) in
12 ( !requestor(skS1 ,ID1 ,stuRoleID ,campusOneID) | !requestor(skS2 ,ID2 ,acdRoleID ,campusOneID) |
13 !requestor(skS3 ,ID3 ,admRoleID ,campusOneID) | ruracket(skR ,stuRoleID ,acdRoleID ,admRoleID , campusOneID) |
14 attendanceracket(skCR ,stuRoleID ,campusOneID )) |
15 ( !requestor(skS1 ,ID1 ,stuRoleID ,campusTwoID) | !requestor(skS2 ,ID2 ,acdRoleID ,campusTwoID) |
16 !requestor(skS3 ,ID3 ,admRoleID ,campusTwoID) | ruracket(skR ,stuRoleID ,acdRoleID ,admRoleID , campusTwoID) |
17 attendanceracket(skCR ,stuRoleID ,campusTwoID ))
Regarding the queries specification, it is necessary to show that
the credits present in each requestor card remains secret and we tied
together the event of restaurant authentication with the event of Uni-
versity restaurant service. By doing this we assured that for each credit
payment should have one requestor authentication at the restaurant.
4.5.5 Formal Verification
We gathered the most relevant outputs that come out of our
process execution and we are able to see in Listing4.5.5.
The first result(lines 1-2) shows that the attacker can not change
or see the credit value, so that protects University resources. In this
sense we demonstrate that they keys do not leak from and the informa-
tion can not be decrypted within the policy implementation. Moreover,
we can assert that the information used to determine the context-aware
access control decision is private and can not be tampered with by an
attacker.
Listing 4.5.5-6 – Process Execution
1
2 Starting query not attacker_p7(creditsAtCard [])
3 RESULT not attacker_p7(creditsAtCard []) is true.
4
5 Starting query event(creditPayment(idRequestor_206 )) ==> event(restaurantAuth(idRequestor_206 ))
6 RESULT event(creditPayment(idRequestor_206 )) ==> event(restaurantAuth(idRequestor_206 )) is true.
7
8 RESULT Weak secret id is true (bad not derivable ).
The second result(lines 4-5) is showing that every requestor tes-
ted on the numerous sessions had to authenticate with the restau-
rant racket before any payment or credits update. This authentica-
tion avoids a a man-in-the-middle attack, because no other entitie can
pretend to be a racket.
This second result is important because by assuring the identi-
ties of the rackets within our context-aware access control policy we
can assert the properties of geolocation required by the policy specifi-
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cation. Asserting identities and avoiding MitM attacks will guarantee
the enforcement of the location context with Proteus
The third result(line 7) is just to confirm that the identifiers
used by roles, campus and requestors is weak but this does not make it
derivable by guessing. We added this testing because we are required
to use the mifare contactless cards and this low entropy is a known
problem of these card.
4.6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we devised a context-aware access control policy,
based on the Proteus model, that uses a Trustful Space-Time Protocol
for communication between IoT devices. We described the interactions
of a scenario based on smart campus setting. We specified the sym-
bolic model of the scenario and verified it using an automatic protocol
verification tool called Proverif.
Our access control policy covers a Smart campus scenario and
it is prepared for IoT environments needs. We described all context
elements for a resource context on University domain and it can be
generalized for other resources. After conceiving the descriptions for
the policy we were able to build a symbolic model. This model was
formally proved on Proverif and its outputs demonstrated that our
model keep sensitive personal information secret.
As future work, we plan to build more policies targeting the IoT
environments heterogeneity, dynamicity, unpredictability. These poli-
cies could integrate a more generical and complex policy, that will give
us better scenary context abstractions. We further could apply the
entire Proteus Middleware Architecture, composed by Police Instala-
tion Manager, Reasoning Core, Policy Enforcement Manager and the
Context Manager.
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5 FINAL REMARKS
In this work, we did a formal analysis of the Trustful Space-
Time Protocol(TSTP) and we came up with a new access control po-
licy that uses TSTP. We described TSTP’s keybootstrapping and time
synchronization protocols(RESNER; FRÖHLICH, 2015) using an automa-
tic cryptographic protocol verifier tool named Proverif. We described
interactions of a Smart Campus scenario and we used our knowledge
and experience with Proverif to specify a symbolic model of that sce-
nario. The protocol formally verified in our first contribution was used
as communication protocol for the access control policy that was our
second contribution.
The automatic analysis of the protocol found an attack invol-
ving the time synchronization part, that could result in impersonation
attacks and the attacker could read any message passed on the secure
channel. We proposed two specific modifications to the protocol as
counter-measures for the security flaw. The first modification was to
change the MAC-then-Encrypt approach for Encrypt-then-MAC; this
was a problem that even Proverif did not detect and this change could
increase the security. The second modification could be done chan-
ging the time synchronization part or making all the clocks involved
on TSTP to follow the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, that has an advisable
clock accuracy of at least ±40ppm.
We were able to see that in TSTP an attacker might not only
find a correct ID, but he could deploy a malicious node at the right
time and place(RESNER; FROHLICH, 2015). This synchrony is needed
because TSTP does not derive its key from just one pre-distributed
information, but from a set of data with good entropy. Of course, as
there is always a pre-distributed datum, it is still important to avoid a
key derivation based on just one value. Therefore the TSTP protocol
decisions and its features are the reasons behind our choice to use this
protocol on our second work.
Our second goal achieved was a context-aware access control
scheme for IoT environments. We created an access control policy for
that scheme, covering a Smart Campus scenario. We specified all the
required elements for a resource context on University domain, based
on Proteus model(BOTTAZZI; MONTANARI; TONINELLI, 2007). After
that we described a symbolic model according to the context elements
requirements. Our last step was a formal analysis of the symbolic mo-
del, that represents the access control policy, assuring that the sensitive
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data remained secret.
For future work, we could create different policies encompassing
more heterogeneous IoT gadgets. We could extend the use of TSTP
for different environments and maybe a computational model verifica-
tion of the entire Smart Campus scenario’s infrastructure. The policies
could become more susceptible to changes, implementing the mecha-
nism of policy re-evaluation and policy enforcement present in the Pro-
teus description. As far as we know, the use of TSTP it is still just for
academic purposes, but after the formal verification it should be tested
inside other areas, like smart-buildings, smart-manufacturing and so
on. The Smart Campus scenario was tested in a minimal scenario, so it
would be very interesting if we could test the computational model of
the hole infra, using CryptoVerif, another automatic verification tool.
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